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ABSTRACT: I will demonstrate that conductive arguments are found in the inference to the best explana-
tion as it is used in science. Conductive arguments, I argue, operate on two levels: the first is in the con-
struction of hypotheses; the second is through the competition of hypotheses.  By constructing arguments 
based on observations of facts, all possible (conceivable) factors are taken into account and a judgment is 
made based on our weighing of considerations: conductive argumentation. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Taking into consideration the pros and cons of a situation and consequently making an 
argument for a conclusion is common in many forms of practical reasoning. Despite this 
simplistic, if not obvious, way in which we often construct arguments, little work has 
been done in this area of argumentation. It is generally assumed that we operate in either 
an inductive or deductive methodology when arguing. What has not been readily ad-
dressed is this intuitive notion of balancing considerations, that is, the practice of conduc-
tive argument construction.   
 My aim throughout this essay is to demonstrate where conductive arguments can 
be found in the practice of inference to the best explanation as it is used in science. Con-
ductive arguments, I argue, operate on two levels: the first is in the construction of hy-
potheses; the second is through the competition of hypotheses. Given my aim I have de-
voted the first half of this essay to the elucidation and discussion of conductive argu-
ments. The second half of this paper demonstrates where conductive arguments fit into 
the inference to the best explanation, and how they are used in hypothesis formation. I 
conclude that there is more work to be done in the area of conductive arguments, but it is 
clear from what I have presented that conductive arguments operate in science through 
the inference to the best explanation. 
2. CONDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
2.1 Carl Wellman 
Carl Wellman attempted to find justification for ethics using different arguments, i.e. de-
duction, induction, and conduction. After discussing deduction and induction, Wellman 
comes to what he coins as “conduction” (Wellman 1971: 51). Wellman begins by stating 
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that a conductive argument is neither inductive nor deductive, but should not be thought 
of in terms of this negative definition (Wellman 1971: 51). What Wellman has in mind 
for conductive arguments is a definition that consists of four components: “(1) a conclu-
sion about some individual case (2) is drawn nonconclusively (3) from one or more prem-
ises about the same case (4) without any appeal to other cases” (Wellman 1971: 51). 
While Wellman provides this definition of a conductive argument, he also identifies a 
number of patterns which constitute conductive arguments. 
 The first of the three patterns that Wellman identifies is “exhibited by any con-
ductive argument in which a single reason is given for the conclusion” (Wellman 1971: 
55). The single reason given is presumed to outweigh any other considerations, even to 
the point where they are not mentioned. The second pattern consists of “several reasons 
... given for the conclusion” (Wellman 1971: 56). Counter considerations in this pattern 
may not be mentioned because it is presumed the reasons given are strong enough. Ques-
tioning the conclusion of this second pattern of conductive arguments would require 
questioning the validity of the conclusion or inference. The third pattern is “that form of 
argument in which some conclusion is drawn from both positive and negative considera-
tions” (Wellman 1971: 57). This pattern of argument is demonstrated when an arguer 
attempts to provide all relevant facts, positive and negative. 
 The third pattern of conductive arguments is the pattern most discussed within 
the literature.  It is considered to be the most important given its applicability. Though 
Wellman originally wrote the chapter on conductive arguments in a book concerning eth-
ics, he realised that conductive arguments are used extensively outside of ethical argu-
ments. The use of the third pattern of conductive arguments is applicable to many other 
types of arguments, i.e. public policy or political debates. The ‘weighing’ of arguments 
that is present in the third pattern is one of the most intuitive aspects of conductive argu-
ments, that is, weighing and considering multiple premises for a conclusion is conceiva-
bly done when engaging in argumentation. 
2.1 Trudy Govier 
Govier in her book Philosophy of Argument discusses conductive arguments in the chap-
ter “Reasoning with Pros and Cons: Conductive Arguments Revisited” (Govier 1999). As 
the title of the chapter suggests, Govier argues that conductive argumentation (of the third 
type) is the consideration of pros and cons, that is, weighing different aspects of pros and 
cons in an effort to determine the strength of the argument arriving at a final conclusion. 
 Govier addresses conductive arguments through a number of examples. In one 
of these examples, she states that phrases like “‘even with’ and ‘further’ are indicators 
that we are in the conductive domain: separate reasons are being put forward” (Govier 
1999: 164). These are indicators because they entertain counter-considerations or ‘cons’ 
to the argument being put forth. Govier is extending Wellman’s understanding of weigh-
ing the strength of reasons. The, more distinct,—extension of Wellman’s work—is Go-
vier’s addition to evaluating conductive arguments. 
 Wellman was reluctant to propose a definite schema or set of rules for conduc-
tive arguments. He believed that it would be a mistake to do so because of the fluid na-
ture of conductive arguments. Govier, however, does attempt to provide some rough 
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guidelines for the evaluation of conductive arguments. The following is from her latest 
textbook A Practical Study of Argument: 
(1) Determine whether the premises offered to support the conclusion are acceptable. 
(2) Determine whether the premises offered to support the conclusion are positively 
relevant to it, and assess the strength of the reasons. 
(3) Determine whether any counterconsiderations acknowledged by the arguer are 
negatively relevant to the conclusion. 
(4) Think what additional counterconsiderations, not acknowledged by the arguer, 
are negatively relevant to the conclusion. 
(5) Reflect on whether the premises, taken together, outweigh the counterconsidera-
tions, taken together, and make a judgment. Try to articulate good reasons for 
that judgment. 
(6) If you judge that the premises do outweigh the counterconsiderations, you have 
judged that the R and G conditions are satisfied. Provided that A is also satisfied, 
you deem the argument cogent. Otherwise, you deem it not to be cogent. (Govier 
2010: 365-366) 
Govier’s addition to Wellman’s conductive arguments is through the evaluation of conduc-
tive arguments. Wellman provided a characterisation of different patterns of conductive ar-
guments and Govier provided a loose structure for the evaluation of conductive arguments. 
3. INFERENCE TO THE BEST EXPLANATION 
I have introduced a conductive argument, as described by Wellman, as something which 
is neither inductive nor deductive, as well as something that takes into consideration the 
pros and cons. A conductive argument, simply put, is an argument that can take the form 
of a balance of considerations argument. Furthermore, the implications of conductive 
arguments operating in scientific explanation are of the utmost importance for this essay. 
While philosophy of science and argumentation theory are each vast in their own rights, I 
will limit my scope of investigation to the prevalence of conductive arguments in the ‘in-
ference to the best explanation’ (IBE for short) found in John Pollock and Joseph Cruz’s 
Contemporary Theories of Knowledge (1999).
1
 
 Examples of conductive arguments present in IBE are twofold. The first is the 
presence of multiple premises. The second is the weighing of evidence in competing hy-
potheses. I address both in turn.   
3.1 Science: Multiple Arguments/Premises 
When arguments are put forth in science there is usually more than one premise taken 
into account. What is implicit in each of these premises is that they contribute to the ar-
gument and, given all of the facts, the conclusion “x” is justified. Pollock spends a great 
                                                 
1
  While I am investigating IBE, burden of proof is also relevant to this discussion. Burden of proof, how-
ever, is an area of discussion that surpasses the space I have available. Also, while burden of proof is an 
immense topic, I believe that IBE is an appropriate beginning to any further discussion on the relation 
of burden of proof and conductive arguments. It is an important topic for another time. 
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deal of time writing in the area of epistemology and philosophy of science to explain the 
belief, justification, and warrant in deciding a conclusion. Pollock and Cruz explain that 
IBE is another form of inductive reasoning, one which underlines much of science while 
also being common in everyday life (Pollock & Cruz 1999: 41). As Pollock and Cruz 
explain, a set of observations is often used to make (an) argument(s) for a particular hy-
pothesis (Pollock & Cruz 1999: 41). Given observations of facts we construct an IBE. 
While Pollock and Cruz suggest that this is inductive reasoning, I believe it is an example 
of conductive reasoning. By constructing arguments based on observations of facts, all 
possible (conceivable) factors are taken into account and a judgment is made based on 
our weighing of considerations: conductive argumentation.  
 While epistemic justification of facts and observations is needed to construct an 
argument for a hypothesis, Pollock believes that an ideal warrant is one way of under-
standing ‘justification in the limit’ (Pollock 1995: 133). Justification in the limit, is the limit 
of justification of a proposition, given that the epistemic status may change over time. To 
be justified in the limit with respect to ideal warranting is to recognise the limit of justifica-
tion of something which may in fact change but given our current observations and testing 
our statements are warranted. The ideal warrant that Pollock introduces is an expression of 
this justification in limit. Pollock’s definition of the ideal warrant is as follows: 
A sequent S is ideally warranted to degree δ (relative to input) iff there is a node α (relative 
to input) of strength greater than or equal to δ such that (1) αεϛ, (2) α is undefeated relative to 
ϛ, and (3) α supports S. (Pollock, 1995: 133) 
This definition is relevant to conductive arguments because for a conclusion to be ideally 
warranted is when a reasoner can produce all relevant arguments through a survey all of 
the reasoner’s beliefs, weighing the strength of node α relative to δ. In Pollock’s defini-
tion, δ is taken as the ideal standard for conclusion S, thus node α (in input such as a be-
lief) needs to at the very least match if not supersede δ to be ideally warranted.  As long 
as the node is greater than or equal to δ, remaining undefeated, then α supports S; thus 
coming to a warranted justification for the conclusion. To take into account the ideally 
warranted justification is to weigh all considerations for and against a particular conclu-
sion; to argue conductively. 
3.2 Weighing of Arguments: Competing Hypotheses 
While conductive argumentation and reasoning can be seen in the construction of a hy-
pothesis within science, conductive argumentation and reasoning also operates on another 
level. This other level is the competition between different hypotheses. IBE is predomi-
nately found when a reasoner must choose one explanation over another (cf. Harman, 
1968: 165). Science is constantly reassessing its hypotheses and consequently must make 
an inference that one explanation is better than the other—the Inference to the (currently) 
Best Explanation. It is this judging and weighing of hypotheses and choosing one over a 
competing hypothesis that is of interest. 
 Gilbert Harman in a paper entitled “Knowledge, Inference, and Explanation” 
(1968) explains that the analysis of knowledge is to take the analysis as a working hy-
pothesis; but to do so we must take IBE into account (Harman 1968: 167). Furthermore, 
such an analysis renders counterexamples—or perhaps counterconsiderations—useless 
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because IBE is not just a good inference to the best explanation, but IBE plus intuitions 
about what we know (Harman 1968: 167). Thus, when we are faced with competing hy-
potheses IBE is inferred. This, I argue, is another instance of conductive arguments given 
that one must weigh a number of considerations (or premises), to come to a conclusion. 
3.3 Conductive Argument and Hypothesis Formation 
The significance of conductive arguments is found in the hypothesis formation. My pre-
vious points on conductive arguments and hypotheses have been that multiple argu-
ments/premises and competition between hypotheses is evidence of conductive argu-
ments. My innovation into the role of conductive arguments and IBE is that both are in-
tricately involved in the process of hypothesis formation. The collection and evaluation of 
premises to form a hypothesis and then the testing of this hypothesis against other com-
peting ideas is necessary for the survival of any hypothesis. Though I present hypothesis 
formation and testing as distinct, they are only to a certain degree. When contemplating 
the possibilities for explaining a phenomenon one not only weighs the pros and cons of 
the possibilities, but also tests the strength of the hypothesis in thought experiments. Be-
fore you can even physically test a hypothesis in a lab setting, the mental thought experi-
ments have to be played through, and this process itself is also aided by conductive ar-
guments (weighing pros and cons). Also, the contemplation of counterconsiderations or 
counterexamples for a hypothesis involves conductive argumentation. One must weigh 
the pros and cons of each stage of hypothesis formation and proceed accordingly. 
 Hypothesis formation is regulated by conductive argumentation because the up-
dating of information of premises that form hypotheses must be done through a careful 
consideration of all the pros and cons. The ideal justification which I introduced through 
Pollock is an example of a system of justification of beliefs that surveys all conceivable 
objections. If a belief that we once held as being justified is revealed as incorrect, then the 
process of conductive argumentation and hypothesis revision takes place once again. The 
very process of hypothesis formation occurs through the collection and evaluation of 
premises, the updating of our justified and warranted beliefs, and also in the competition 
between hypotheses. In each of these phases, conductive argumentation is utilised, and as 
a consequence conductive argumentation is at the heart of IBE and hypothesis formation. 
 In order to demonstrate conductive argumentation in hypothesis forming, con-
sider the following: phenomenon P occurs and scientists who investigate this phenome-
non believe they have two possibilities. The first being hypothesis A and the second being 
hypothesis B. The scientist who supports hypothesis A does so because the pros outweigh 
the cons, and this consideration of both the pros and cons allows the construction of hy-
pothesis A; and the circumstances are the same for the other scientist who supports a rival 
hypothesis. When a scientist investigates phenomenon P, they construct all conceivable 
possibilities, all the pros and cons. The scientist then constructs and determines whether 
their hypothesis is justified. Through the surveying of possibilities and the subsequent 
construction of a hypothesis, conductive argumentation and reasoning (with IBE and ide-
al warranting) is used. A rival scientist operates in a similar manner with a different hy-
pothesis. When both rival scientists confront each other’s respective theories, they must 
go through the process of evaluation of hypothesis A and B, and determine which hypoth-
esis is correct. To summarise, consider the following notation:  
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Consider theory T and let PT be a set of pros for T and CT a set of cons for T. The 
universe of T is denoted T = PT ∪CT.   
 
Also, consider the worth function which is defined as:  : T  ℝ 
 
Such that (P) ≥ 0 for all P  PT and (C) ≤ 0 for all C  CT and denote the 
merit of a theory T by: 








How pros and cons are weighed is left open. In the worth function above, it is designated 
as real numbers to merely represent pros and cons as positive and negative, respectively. 
This is not to imply that one should weigh pros and cons numerically, only that they have 
some sort of order. The weight of each individual pro and con, and how they contribute to 
the overall merit, depends on the implicit elements of each pro and con and the worth 
value assigned to them by the reasoner. There are no restrictions on the elements within 
each set of pros and cons. Each pro and con has a number of factors that will influence its 
value, and as such each element can be a single element, set, or multiset. For example: 
 
T  = PT ∪CT , where the pros are represented as PT {α, β, γ, ... }, and the cons as 
CT {δ, τ, ρ, ... }.  Also, α, if it is itself a set, may be expanded as α{μ, κ, θ, ... }, etc. 
For competing hypothesis, consider the following representation:  
 
 If г is the set of all theories, define    on г by     
  if       . 
 
The evaluation of a hypothesis, for example A or B, is through the construction of a con-
ductive argument. In the notation above, a hypothesis (or theory)2 is determined to have 
merit if one decides that the pros outweigh the cons. Furthermore, if it is determined that 
theories A and B are inadequate, and they are able to re-evaluate a new set of pros and 
cons, the result is a new hypothesis to be considered. This use of conductive arguments 
and reasoning is explained by the use of weighing the pros and cons taken into considera-
tion, represented in the notation. What is demonstrated by this is a constant renewal of 
hypotheses, which is possible only through the use of conductive argumentation and IBE, as 
each hypothesis is weighed against another (in the notation above a hypothesis is represented 
by T:     
  if MT     , and where MT includes the weighing of all pros and cons). 
Whether a rival hypothesis is determined to be successful, or a new hypothesis is needed, the 
careful consideration and weighing of all possibilities is done and an inference is made to the 
best explanation (IBE). Through the initial construction of a hypothesis or the constant testing 
of one hypothesis against another, a consideration of the pros and cons is used. 
                                                 
2
  Although I have interchanged between using a hypothesis and a theory, the notation provided is testing a 
hypothesis; hence it is represented as a theory. There is no semantic significance behind using either word. 
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3.3.1 Kekulé and Conductive Arguments 
Using the above explanation of taking into consideration the competition of hypothesis 
and the weighing of pros over cons, consider August Kekulé and his discoveries concern-
ing benzene. When Kekulé was beginning his career there was little understanding of 
how benzene was structured. Other compounds that were compiled of the same number 
of carbon and hydrogen reacted different to benzene (cf. Roberts 1989: 75). During the 
period before Kekulé’s breakthrough, no scientist was able to completely formulate, let 
alone justify, a working hypothesis. All ideas, all pros and cons, failed to adequately sup-
port a sufficient hypothesis. 
 Kekulé had a dream
3
 and he imagined in his dream that carbon atoms could form 
a chain, and thus begun his ‘structure theory’ (Roberts 1989: 77). This intuition about the 
structure of molecules was the beginning of a more thorough theory. Kekulé using his 
intuitions about benzene made an IBE and began to form a hypothesis. He continued with 
this structure theory and had another significant flash of inspiration (from a second dream), 
where he imagined that a snake bit its own tail forming a circle. The second dream inspired 
Kekulé’s proposal that carbon could link to other carbon atoms forming a cyclical structure. 
Consider the following, if we consider Kekulé’s idea of carbon linking to other carbon hy-
pothesis A then we should consider Kekulé’s rival/predecessors as hypothesis B. 
 Hypothesis B was tentatively formed and it suffered from constant objections 
and ambiguity in its explanatory power; hypothesis B had overwhelming cons. Hypothe-
sis B is ‘tentatively formed’ because, despite the overwhelming failure, it was the best 
hypothesis available at the time. When Kekulé proposed his cyclical structure it was 
revolutionary but largely criticised because of a lack of ‘evidence.’4 Kekulé, as an organic 
chemist, was well aware of the problems (cons) of the current theories (B) therefore 
worked on and proposed hypothesis A. The pros for A were its new and innovative ap-
proach that filled the gaps of B—primarily by providing a reason why benzene reacted 
differently to other carbon based molecules. The cons for A were the new gaps and ques-
tions left unanswered, i.e. the missing isomers that theoretically should be present from 
Kekulé’s theory. The competition between the scientists and their hypotheses allowed 
continued renewal and refinement of their theories until one became the clear winner. 
Ultimately, hypothesis A was successful because it provided answers for the cons pre-
sented by opposing scientists who supported B. B was left wanting because it failed to 
explain the scientific phenomenon of benzene and its reactions. One could (simplistical-
ly) evaluated Kekulé and his rivals as adding more pros and cons to the already estab-
lished, or emerging, hypothesis because of the debate that they continued to have. As the 
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  Some people have suggested that a hypothesis formed from a dream, or sudden intuition, is not a hy-
pothesis.  The suggestion is that the forming of a hypothesis through a dream or intuition is opposed to 
how I have currently constructed hypothesis formation—that is, there is no conductive reasoning or ar-
guing going on in a dream, or intuition, used to form a hypothesis. I do not think having a dream or in-
tuition is indifferent to conductive reasoning and IBE. Kekulé wanted to solve the problems of organic 
chemistry, and through conductive reasoning (whether conscious or unconscious) came to a certain so-
lution presented or influenced by a dream.  There is always a number of influencing factors, not all of 
which may be known to the reasoner. How we come to solutions for cons is important, but the im-
portant point is that Kekulé made a conductive argument in forming his hypothesis. 
4
  The equipment during this period was inadequate to fully prove Kekulé’s theory, though some experi-
ments were performed. 
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competition of A and B continued, more cons were added to A, however, these cons were 
answered and thus overcome with conductive arguments. The overwhelming weight of 
A’s pros prevailed over its cons, and the pros of its rival B. And with the weighing of evi-
dence favouring A, what is implicit is the shifting of an IBE that at one point supported B 
but supported changed to A. The shift of the IBE is due to the conductive arguments pre-
sented and the weighing of arguments that is implied in conductive arguments, thus lead-
ing to A as the winning (and therefore continued surviving) hypothesis. 
4. CONCLUSION 
To conclude, conductive arguments are present in IBE. When we make an IBE we are 
weighing considerations, weighing evidence, and as such considering the pros and cons. 
Not only is this found in the formation of the hypothesis itself, but at a later point when one 
hypothesis is competing against another. The conductive argument may not always be ob-
vious, but its presence is there, i.e. there are varying degrees of the presence of conductive 
arguments—that is to say, some conductive arguments are stronger and more obvious than 
others. Regardless of how obvious or not a conductive argument is, it is clear that in sci-
ence conductive arguments are used extensively and this is something that has yet to be 
addressed in a serious manner. How we construct arguments, how we construct hypotheses 
or decide which hypothesis is better than another, has obvious impacts on the way we do 
science. The link between IBE and constructive arguments needs to be investigated more 
fully. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
I find myself in agreement with Goorden’s overall thesis that conductive argument is 
prevalent in scientific reasoning and has a crucial role in theory selection. Although Carl 
Wellman in his Challenge and Response did not address scientific argumentation to any 
great degree, we do find sentences such as the following: “But in judging an ethical issue, 
as in establishing a scientific hypothesis, there are usually two sides to be considered.” 
(1971: 25). Trudy Govier, perhaps the principal contemporary theorist of conductive ar-
gument is more explicit: “Any subargument to the effect that H1 is a better explanatory 
hypothesis than its competitors will have a convergent structure and will be a conductive 
argument. Thus IBE arguments require conductive subarguments” (2005: 355). Govier 
holds that conductive arguments are key in evaluation processes of all kinds from inter-
pretations in literature to science to politics to argument evaluation itself. (2005: 395) But 
I believe Goorden is correct that this view has not been widely accepted in the larger 
community of scholars, so it makes sense to further develop and defend this thesis. 
 Goorden’s principal antagonist in his paper is John Pollock who maintains that 
scientific hypotheses are developed using principally inductive reason and argument. 
Goorden puts forward two principal arguments: 
(1) Pollock’s general theory of argument is fundamentally conductive in nature. 
(2) As understood by Gilbert Harman, putative inductive arguments in science are bet-
ter understood as inferences to the best explanation (IBE’s), which are conductive. 
I shall address each of these two arguments in turn, after a comment on vocabulary.  
 I am not entirely clear on the distinction, if any, between Goorden’s key terms 
“hypothesis formation” and “hypothesis construction”. In philosophy of science, hypoth-
esis creation is often distinguished from hypothesis development. Hypothesis creation 
often requires imagination and quirky creativity, as seen in the example of Kekule’s 
dream of circled snakes leading to the successful hypothesis regarding the structure of 
benzene. Hypothesis development on the other hand is a matter of testing and also of re-
lating hypotheses to areas of established knowledge. So I am not sure how to align Goor-
den’s terms ‘construction’ and ‘formation’ with my terms ‘creation’ and ‘development’. I 
understand and accept in general terms Goorden’s concept of hypothesis competition. 
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2. GOORDEN ON POLLOCK AND CONDUCTIVE ARGUMENT 
Working from John Pollock’s concept of an ideal warrant, Dean Goorden argues that “To 
take into account of the ideally warranted justification is to weigh all considerations for 
and against a particular conclusion; to argue conductively.” (p. 4) For Pollock, an ideal 
warrant for a thesis is an argument that supports that thesis and is undefeated by any other 
argument in the argument set. In Dean’s quoted material, Pollock is applying what we 
commonly today refer to as abstract argumentation frameworks. Abstract argumentation 
frameworks (AAF’s) were prominently defined by Dung (1995). Henry Prakken in his 
(2008) characterized Pollock’s system as instance of an AAF (2008: 12).  
 Today there are many versions of AAF’s including extended AAF’s that involve 
weightings and values. In his 2009, Prakken attempts to integrate the AAF approach of 
Pollock with those of other prominent theorists in artificial intelligence and law (AI & 
Law). There remain quite a few outstanding issues and controversies in defining, under-
standing, and applying AAF’s. Given the above background, I will be investigating not so 
much Pollock’s particular views as the more general issue as to whether AAF’s are proper-
ly characterized as conductive in nature. I hope this move is fair to Pollock and to Goorden. 
 My reconstruction of Goorden’s argument in the section of his paper on Pollock 
and conductive argument is as follows: 
(1) Conductive arguments have multiple arguments/premises in mutual contention. 
(2) Pollock’s AAF’s also have multiple arguments/premises in mutual contention. 
(3) Therefore, Pollock’s AAF’s are correctly classified as conductive arguments. 
This is clearly an argument from analogy based on relevant similarities which are accu-
rately described. While I find myself in some sympathy with the outlines of Goorden’s 
view here, I also believe we need to bring in the process/product distinction in theory of 
argument (or argumentation) in order to further refine some terms, distinctions, and is-
sues. A relevant dissimilarity between Pollock’s AAF’s and conductive arguments (rely-
ing here on Govier’s version thereof) is that the former, an AAF, is a process, whereas 
the latter, a conductive argument, is a product. I interpret Goorden’s conclusion as in-
volving the term conductive argumentation process. Let’s look at the root meanings of 
“conductive” here in order to navigate the process/product distinction. 
 The term “conductive” apparently derives from the Latin word “conducere” which 
means “to bring together”, as an orchestra conductor brings together the various instru-
ments and musicians into a unitary musical performance. Both conductive arguments and 
conductive argumentation processes involve bringing multiple conflicting reasons together, 
so Goorden’s argument from analogy above does work at a very general level which treats 
the process/product distinction in theory of argument as of marginal importance. 
 The process/product distinction has been addressed many times in theory of argu-
ment, including very recently by Chris Reed and Douglas Walton in their (2010). Reed and 
Walton argue that argument schemes, in their sense of that term, provide a “particularly 
close tie between the product- and process-oriented representations” in theory of argument. 
The product-oriented approach is typified in argument diagramming, and the process ap-
proach is of course dialogical and dialectical. The overall thesis of Reed and Walton in this 
paper seems to be that the process and product approaches are distinct but interactive, and 
each approach is indispensable. It is easy to see in general terms how argument schemes 
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connect product and process, since the basic scheme is an argument form and the associat-
ed critical questions are dialogical. As an illustration, Reed and Walton mention an ongoing 
Archelogos project to lay out the structure of apparently all the arguments of Plato.  
 It may be helpful here to take a deeper look at the process/product distinction as 
provided by Walton in his (2010). In this paper, Walton is addressing analogical argu-
ments as they typically appear in argumentation. Our interest here in Walton’s paper is 
not in the analogical argument type itself but rather in general process/product issues that 
he addresses in this paper.  
 In Walton’s view, what he calls the “simple scheme” for argument from analogy is 
found at what he calls the “presentation stage” when the argument is viewed as “provisional-
ly acceptable” (ibid.: 27). The usually later “evaluation stage” according to Walton exhibits  
…the more complex type of scheme advocated by Guarini which functions as a device for 
evaluating an argument from analogy as strong or weak. The idea is that the two schemes 
need to be employed in tandem, with the simple scheme being used first and the more com-
plex scheme being used to follow up. (Walton 2011: 27) 
The relevance here to us is that distinct argument forms typically appear at different dia-
log stages, with evaluation-oriented forms appearing most typically in the later stages of 
the dialog. It seems to me that the sequence of presentation stage and then evaluation 
stage is probably common in argumentation, with the evaluation stage being obviously 
the attempt at a resolution of the point at issue.  
 According to Govier, conductive argument forms are a pre-eminent evaluative 
argument form. Govier’s overall view is that conductive arguments are key in evaluation 
processes of all kinds from interpretations in literature to science to politics to argument 
evaluation itself (2005: 395). It seems appropriate to me to say that conductive arguments 
are common in the later stages of a typical dialectical exchange, with the earlier stages 
being typified by the presentation of contending reasons. But given this, do we want to 
say that abstract argumentation frameworks, including Pollock’s, are conductive, at least 
in a process sense? I think this would be an overstatement and do not agree with Goorden 
on that point. AAF’s abstract from argument content, which it seems to me has to mean 
abstracting from argument forms and thus from argument as product. I think the term 
“conductive” has to stay allied with argument as product and the conductive argument 
form. Perhaps the following formulation would work: All conductive arguments are dia-
lectical, but not all dialectical processes are conductive. There is room for further dis-
course regarding how to fine-tune these technical terms in theory of argument. Product is 
involved in process, but that should not mean that product is dissolved in process. 
3. GOORDEN ON HARMAN, IBE’S, AND CONDUCTIVE ARGUMENT 
Goorden’s second major argument in this paper is that, according to Gilbert Harman, in-
duction as used in science and elsewhere is really an inference to the best explanation, or 
IBE. Gilbert Harman in his (1963: 88) stated that “all warranted inferences which may be 
described as instances of enumerative induction must also be described as instances of the 
inference to the best explanation.” Harman’s view is one of many understandings of in-
ference to the best explanation, which is sometimes alternatively identified as abduction 
or argument to the best explanation (ABE). There has been surprisingly little consensus 
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to date on the nature of IBE’s, or ABE’s, or abduction. Douglas Walton provides an al-
ternative, dialogical-based account of IBE’s in his (2005), and John Woods and Dov 
Gabbay put forward a very technical account of abduction in their (2004). In the present 
commentary, I shall address only Harman’s views on IBE’s (or abduction, ABE’s). 
 Goorden relates Harman’s concept of IBE’s to conductive argument as follows: 
“Thus, when we are faced with competing hypotheses IBE is inferred. This, I argue, is 
another instance of conductive arguments given that one must weigh a number of consid-
erations (or premises), to come to a conclusion.” In his explication of inference to the best 
explanation, Harman proposes among other things to interpret inductive generalization 
argument forms (example #1 below) as being IBE’s (example #2 below):  
(1) Inductive: All of the X number of swans observed to date have been white and 
none black; therefore all swans are white. 
(2) IBE: The quantity X of swans observed to date has been white and zero ob-
served have been black or any other color; the best explanation of these observa-
tions is that all swans are white; therefore, all swans are white. 
Presumably the alternative explanations of all observed swans being white would involve 
biased sampling methods or possibly a sample size that is too small. Whether all putative 
inductive arguments should be replaced by IBE versions is an interesting thesis which I 
shall not attempt to assess. The present relevance is that Goorden argues that the “for-
mation” of hypotheses involves IBE’s and hence conductive argument. 
 For the sake of argument, let us provisionally grant the basics of Harman’s view 
that inductive logic is really abductive logic under the hood, so to speak. Clearly the con-
ductive part of Harman’s IBE argument form is the implicit subargument supporting the 
premise to the effect that that one particular explanation is the best available one for the 
given observation. Such a subargument supporting that premise would both involve mul-
tiple explanations and, commonly, multiple criteria of explanatory goodness.  
 It seems to me that much of the time the premise stating the ‘best explanation’ in 
Harman’s IBE is not supported by a conductive subargument. Instead, the ‘best explana-
tion’ based on it is a presumptively plausible one. We could say that plausibilistic, pre-
sumptive reasoning is latently conductive; but that seems to be a stretch. It is a fair point 
that, while everyday reasoning is typically presumptive, scientific reasoning is less often 
so. On the other hand, paradigm-based ‘normal’ scientific reasoning in the Kuhnian sense 
is presumptive in many ways as well. 
 In his (1973) in a section on inference to the best explanation, Harman discusses the 
defeasible generalization that doctors’ diagnoses are correct; Harman uses an example of a 
doctor diagnosing measles in a particular case. Harman describes one exception condition as 
the doctor misperceiving the patient’s symptoms. Regarding this example, Harman says “The 
competing explanatory statements here are not other explanations of the doctor’s being right 
but rather explanations of his being wrong.” (1973: 132) We thus seem to have in Harman 
two somewhat distinct senses of competing hypotheses, which I think is significant. 
 Harman’s example of the doctor’s diagnosis illustrates the point that arguments 
involving the application of generalities to cases inherently involve a paired pro and con 
structure, with reasons for the generality applying being on the pro side and the excep-
tions on the con side. Harman is here applying defeasible generalization with a known, 
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relevant exception category in an individual case. In such an application, we would defi-
nitely have paired pro and con reasons.  
 If all conductive arguments are defeasible case applications with the pros and 
cons being generalities and their respective exception conditions, then all pro and con 
reasons are paired in the sense above. But as has been pointed out by Pinto: 
Wellman himself (1971: 68) says that “the factors [or considerations adduced in a conductive 
argument] do not always occur neatly in pairs, one pro balanced against one con” (italics 
added). In saying this he seems to be conceding that sometimes pro and con considerations do 
occur “neatly in pairs”. (Pinto 2010: 5) 
Whereas paired conductive arguments are featured in Harman’s account of IBE’s in hy-
pothesis development, unpaired conductive arguments seem especially prominent in the 
other area of focus for Goorden, hypothesis competition. 
 A widely used example of hypothesis competition is the transition from the Ptol-
emaic geocentric theory in astronomy to the Copernican heliocentric theory. In the very 
early years of the heliocentric Copernican theory (a ‘hypothesis’ at that stage), the long-
standing geocentric Ptolemaic theory had the edge in all major criteria of goodness in 
other than simplicity. The argument in those early years might be summarized as follows: 
(1) Pro: The Ptolemaic theory has more coherence with other established 
views than other competing theories. 
(2) Pro: The Ptolemaic theory has more documented empirical success to 
date than other competing theories. 
(3) Con: The Copernican theory has more elegance/simplicity than other 
competing theories. 
(4) So, the Ptolemaic theory is the best available theoretical explanation. 
Eventually, the empirical support swung to the Copernican side, but the Copernican’s 
theory’s lack of coherence with prevailing non-scientific views was famously an issue for 
a very long time. Clearly the above argument from astronomy is conductive but does not 
have paired pros and cons.  
 In selecting which of the two rival theories is the best one, general criteria of ex-
planatory goodness are applied. These criteria in recent years have usually been described as 
some combination of (1) empirical success, (2) scope, (3) coherence with existing theories, 
and (4) simplicity or elegance, the last being understood in various ways. This kind of con-
ductive argument to the best explanation consists at least predominantly of unpaired pros and 
cons, unlike the case-based applications of defeasible generalizations (generalities).  
 Working with multiple criteria of diverse kinds is a central feature of conductive 
arguments. Pinto in his 2010 quoted from Wellman’s (1971: 54) as follows: 
Whenever some descriptive predicate is ascribed on the basis of a family resemblance conductive 
reasoning takes place. In all such cases there are several criteria for the application of the term and 
each of these criteria may be satisfied to a greater or lesser degree and they may vary in im-
portance as well. The fact that one or more criteria are satisfied in a particular instance is a reason 
for applying the term, but the inference is non-conclusive and does not appeal to the fact that the 
criteria have been found empirically associated with the term in other cases. (Pinto 2010: 17) 
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I suggest there may be a strong and interesting association between, on the one hand, be-
ing case-based and having paired pros and cons, and on the other not being case-based 
and having unpaired pros and cons. While Wellman famously believed that all conductive 
arguments are inherently case-based, Govier does not agree with Wellman on that point: 
“In the sense in which ‘case’ means instance, or particular case, I do not think it is useful 
to reserve the term conductive argument for arguments of which the conclusion deals 
with a particular case as distinct from some general issue” (personal communication). 
 Perhaps applying the paired/unpaired distinction to the case-based/non-case-
based distinction would advance the discussion as to whether all conductive arguments 
should be described as case-based. This area of exploration may or may not work out, but 
it seems to be worth a longer look. I view my comments above as more of an extension of 
Goorden’s second argument rather than a major objection to it. Most of my analyses in 
this commentary center on argument as product, which I for one view as the senior part-
ner, so to speak, in the process-product distinction that we have been addressing. 
4. CONCLUSION  
In summary, I suggest the following: (1) It may prove fruitful to explore further the dis-
tinction between paired and non-paired types of reasons in theory of conductive argu-
ment; (2) The term “conductive” is most usefully applied with an emphasis on argument 
as product rather than as process, although both these approaches can have value; (3) An 
IBE applying presumptively established knowledge to an instance may not be conductive 
as an argument product; and (4) An analysis of the distinction between ‘conductive’ and 
‘dialectical’ as key terms might prove helpful. 
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